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Security & PCI

Card data stays on the terminal. Commands need keys we do not hold.

TickFlow Field is designed to stay out of your cardholder data environment and to make a remote fix as accountable as one done in person. Here is what that means for you; the mechanisms, for your security team and your QSA, are in our technical briefing.

PCI DSS scoping

Designed to keep you out of PCI scope.

Field never receives card data: it is removed on the device, and the server quarantines any bundle where a rule still matches. Field never touches the payment kernel, the card reader’s secure path or PIN entry. On Android, the agent is a regular or vendor-approved app and must not weaken the terminal’s PTS posture.

We write this scoping argument down for each customer’s QSA. The assessment and its conclusion stay with your QSA; Field holds no PCI certification of its own as a product.

Payment boundary · untouchedCard reader secure pathPayment kernelPIN entry
The rest of the terminalField agent · redaction enginePOS app logs · screenshots · state
Field gatewaybundle with [PAN] tokens · re-scanned
Outbound only: the terminal opens every connection. Nothing crosses the payment boundary.

Redaction on the device

Card numbers are gone before anything is sent.

Card numbers, track data, PINs and personal data are removed on the terminal, by the same rules on every kind of device. The server checks every report again and holds back anything that still looks like card data. Order numbers and other look-alikes survive, so the evidence stays useful.

Approvals

Risky fixes need two people. The service alone cannot run them.

Everyday fixes can run under your policy. A reboot or a wipe also needs an approval that the part of Field sending commands cannot produce on its own, so even a compromised server cannot make a terminal do something drastic.

Rolling out Hardware-backed device attestation: where the terminal supports it, a device proves it is genuine before it is trusted.

destructive · needs 2 peopleapp.clear_dataon Suburbs T-11
Northwind BankDana K. approves
and
OrthoplexEli E. approves
✓Approval signer re-checks both votes and signs with its own key. The terminal refuses the command without that signature.

Requested by Uma U. — who cannot approve her own request.

Nobody approves their own request.

The person who asks for a destructive action cannot approve it. By default one approver is from your organisation and one from Orthoplex, and an approval expires and is checked again if the device changed in the meantime.

Remote sessions Rolling out

A last resort, with the door locked behind it.

Most problems are fixed by a named playbook. For the few that are not, an engineer can see the screen, take control or open a locked-down console. Each is a separate permission, and every one of them follows the same six rules.

  • ViewSee the screen with the person at the device.
  • ControlTap and type for them, when a playbook cannot.
  • ConsoleA locked-down command console, for the cases nothing else covers.
recordingDowntown T-06 · viewends in 14:59
Northwind Pay
Payment in progressThe screen is hidden from the viewer until the payment ends.
On the terminalAllow Orthoplex support to view this screen?DenyAllow
  1. 01Off by defaultNobody can start a session until your organisation turns sessions on, per fleet.
  2. 02Consent on the deviceThe person at the terminal sees who is asking and why, and can say no.
  3. 03Approved firstEvery session is approved before it starts. The command console needs two people.
  4. 04Blank during paymentsThe screen goes dark to the viewer while a payment is in progress. Card entry is never seen.
  5. 05RecordedWho watched, what they did and for how long, kept with the ticket and in the ledger.
  6. 06Time-limitedA session ends on its own. Extending it means asking again.

The ledger

Every action leaves evidence you can verify.

Proposal, policy decision, approvals, the command, the device’s acknowledgement, the result and the verification: each is written to a tamper-evident ledger. Nobody can quietly change or remove an entry, you can check that the record is intact, and you can export it for your auditors.

The staff console's ledger view: hash-chained rows for each command with their hashes.
  1. #18,229proposalapp.restart v3 · T-06 · triage 78%e57ae585…e70b
  2. #18,230policyruns on its own · change · known issueprev e57ae585…e70b → 5b399308…8741
  3. #18,231commandissued · signedprev 5b399308…8741 → 0f73dbee…79b0
  4. #18,232ackT-06 accepted · waited 4 s for idleprev 0f73dbee…79b0 → 594942d3…7507
  5. #18,233resultok · exit 0 · 3.1 sprev 594942d3…7507 → c87c69c8…06af
  6. #18,234verifyhealth check passedprev c87c69c8…06af → ecc800cf…146b

chain verified · 18,234 rows · no entry can be changed or removed

Our rules

Six rules decide every trade-off.

  • Dormant by default

    No streaming. The device keeps its own recent evidence and sends only a small signed check-in until someone reports.

  • Redact at the edge

    Card numbers, track data, PINs and personal data are stripped on the device. The server re-checks and never relies on itself alone.

  • Outbound only

    Terminals sit behind merchant firewalls. The device always opens the connection; nothing ever connects to it.

  • Nothing arbitrary

    Remote actions are named, signed playbooks with typed parameters. No shell. A remote session is a consented, recorded last resort.

  • Four-eyes

    AI proposes, policy decides, people approve. Nobody approves their own request; destructive actions need two people.

  • Tamper-evident ledger

    Every command, approval and result is a row in an append-only, hash-chained ledger you can verify and export.

Detailed technical briefing available on request

The how behind this page — the redaction engine, the key model, the ledger and our threat model — is in our technical briefing for customers, security teams and assessors. Ask us for access, then sign in.

Sign in to the briefing →

Privacy & residency

Stored in Canada. Kept only as long as it is useful.

Diagnostic bundles
30 days
encrypted, then deleted
Redacted search index
13 months
for clusters and known issues
Action ledger
7 years
audit evidence
AI providers
No training
zero or limited retention; you can switch AI off

Canadian storage by default, with a per-tenant region on Enterprise. Data minimisation is built in: dormant agents, redaction at the edge, no request bodies in network logs.

Bring your security team to the demo.

We will walk your security team and your QSA through the scoping argument, the redaction and the ledger, on a live terminal.

Book a demoEstimate your savings

Or write to hello@tickflow.co

Report a problem.
TickFlow Field

On-demand diagnosis and remote repair for payment terminals and field devices. Part of the TickFlow family, built by Orthoplex Solutions in Canada.

hello@tickflow.co

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© 2026 Orthoplex Solutions. TickFlow and TickFlow Field are products of Orthoplex Solutions.Pilot targets and figures marked illustrative are not results.ServiceNow, Zendesk and ClickUp are trademarks of their respective owners (ClickUp™ of Mango Technologies, Inc.), named to show compatibility; no partnership is implied, and TickFlow is not affiliated with, endorsed by or sponsored by them.